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Workers' Compensation

by H. Michael Bagley*
Daniel C. Kniffen**
and Katherine D. Dixon***

I.

LEGISLATION

The year 2007 was relatively quiet for workers' compensation
legislation in the Georgia General Assembly. However, there were
several statutory modifications of note.1
The Georgia Workers' Compensation Act 2 has long excluded "farm
laborers" from its coverage.3 The scope of that exclusion was clarified
by including within the term farm laborer "any person employed by an
employer in connection with the raising and feeding of and caring for
wildlife, as such term is defined in paragraph (77) of [Official Code of
Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.")] Section 27-1-2."4 The Code section
referenced defines wildlife as "any vertebrate or invertebrate animal life
indigenous to this state or any species introduced or specified by the
board and includes fish, except domestic fish produced by aquaculturists
registered under [O.C.G.A.] Section 27-4-255, mammals, birds, fish,
amphibians, reptiles, crustaceans, and mollusks or any part thereof."5

* Partner in the firm of Drew, EckI & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory
University (B.A., 1977); University of Georgia (J.D., 1980). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Partner in the firm of Drew, EckI & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer
University (B.A., 1981; J.D., cum laude, 1984). Member, Mercer Law Review (1982-1984);
Editor in Chief (1983-1984). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Partner in the firm of Drew, Eckl & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory
University (B.A., 1983); University of Georgia (J.D., cum laude, 1990). Executive Editor,
Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law (1989-1990). Member, State Bar
of Georgia.
1. Ga. H.R. Bill 424, Reg. Sess. (2007) contains almost all modifications impacting the
Georgia Workers' Compensation Act.
2. O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-1 to -421 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
3. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-2(a).
4. Id. § 34-9-2(a)(1) (Supp. 2007).
5. O.C.G.A. § 27-1-2(77) (2007).
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During the legislative session, this was commonly referred to as the
"Alligator Farm" amendment. 6
Since 1985 claims that were not being prosecuted-those evidenced by
the absence of any hearing being conducted for a period of at least five
years-were deemed to "automatically stand dismissed., 7 This provision
was modified for any injuries occurring on or after July 1, 2007.8 Any
claim filed with the Georgia State Board of Workers' Compensation (the
"Board") after that time, for which neither medical nor income benefits
have been paid, shall "stand dismissed with prejudice by operation of
law if no hearing has been held within five years of the alleged date of
injury."9 This provision applies to all claims except certain and
specified occupational disease claims.' 0
In another housekeeping modification to the Workers' Compensation
Act, the General Assembly clarified the provisions for independent
medical evaluations." These provisions have long required that the
employee submit to an examination "by a duly qualified physician or
surgeon."' 2 The legislature clarified that the evaluation "may include
physical, psychiatric, and psychological examinations."' 3
Similarly, the Board's power to approve the fees of medical providers
was clarified to affirmatively include "charges for prescription drugs, and
charges for other items" in addition to the fees of physicians and charges
of hospitals. 4
Effective July 1, 2007, the maximum rate for temporary total
disability benefits was increased from $425 to $500 per week," and the
maximum rate for temporary
partial disability benefits was raised from
16
$284 to $334 per week.

6. Two decisions were the impetus for this legislation. In Cook v. PrehistoricPonds,
Inc., 282 Ga. App. 904, 640 S.E.2d 383 (2006) and Gill v. PrehistoricPonds, Inc., 280 Ga.
App. 629, 634 S.E.2d 769 (2006), the Georgia Court of Appeals held that alligator farms are
not subject to the farm exclusion. Cook, 282 Ga. App. at 905, 640 S.E.2d at 384; Gill, 280
Ga. App. at 633, 634 S.E.2d at 773.
7. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-100(c) (2004) (amended 2007).
8. Id. § 34-9-100(c) (Supp. 2007).
9. Id. § 34-9-100(d)(1).
10. Id. § 34-9-100(d)(2).
11. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-202(a) (2004 & Supp. 2007).
12. Id. § 34-9-202(a) (2004) (amended 2007).
13. Id. § 34-9-202(a) (Supp. 2007).
14. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-205(a) (Supp. 2007).
15. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-261 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
16. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-262 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
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AUTHORIZED MEDICAL CARE

Perhaps the most fundamental benefit afforded to injured workers
under the Workers' Compensation Act is the provision of medical care,
and there are mutual obligations and rights imposed by law on both the
employer and the employee. In Goswick v. Murray County Board of
Education,7 the employee suffered an injury that was accepted as
compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act. Subsequently, the
employee ceased attending medical appointments for an extended period
of time. In an effort to force the employee to appear, the employer
attempted to schedule an examination with the authorized treating
physician utilizing the independent medical evaluation provisions.
However, the employee refused to appear at the examination, and
following a hearing, an administrative law judge ("ALJ") ordered him to
attend an examination. The employee again refused, contending that
the independent medical evaluation provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act did not apply to authorized treating physicians. At a second
hearing, the ALJ ordered the suspension of income benefits for the
employee's failure to attend the independent medical evaluation, and the
appellate division adopted that award."8 The superior court and the
court of appeals affirmed.19 The court of appeals based its decision on
the fact that the plain language of O.C.G.A. section 34-9-20220 required
only "that the examining physician be duly qualified, not that the
independent nor that the physician not be treating the
physician 2be
1
claimant."
III.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATION

One of the vehicles rarely used by employers to satisfy their obligation
to provide medical treatment for compensable injuries under the
Workers' Compensation Act is a Workers' Compensation Managed Care
Organization ('"WC/MCO"). 22 One of the features of a WC/MCO is that
it has unique provisions for the resolution of disputes. In Metropolitan
23
Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority v. Reid, an employee who had
suffered a compensable injury was receiving treatment through his
employer's WC/MCO. He became dissatisfied with the treatment he was

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

281 Ga. App. 442, 636 S.E.2d 133 (2006).
Id. at 443, 636 S.E.2d at 134.
Id. at 449, 636 S.E.2d at 139.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-202 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
Goswick, 281 Ga. App. at 444, 636 S.E.2d at 135.
See O.C.G.A. § 34-9-201(b)(3) (2004 & Supp. 2007).
282 Ga. App. 877, 640 S.E.2d 300 (2006).
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receiving and applied to the Board for a change of physician.24 While
the Board is vested with general authority to order a change of physician
under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-200(b), 25 Board rules regarding WC/MCOs
specifically require that "'Idlisputes which arise on an issue related to
managed care shall first be processed without charge through the
dispute resolution process of the WC/MCO. ' '

26

In this case, the

employee's request for a change of physician was granted without first
utilizing the WC/MCO's internal dispute resolution process, and the
employer objected.
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed based
primarily upon the following observation:
In its order affirming the AIJ, the appellate division interpreted the
requirements of [O.C.G.A. section] 34-9-200(b) and found that the
Board had jurisdiction to order a change of physician under the
statute. Though this interpretation may conflict with the Board's own
internal published rules, i.e., Board Rule 208(f), the interpretation of
a statute by an administrative agency charged with enforcing its
provisions is given great deference, unless contrary to law. We defer
to the Board's interpretation that [O.C.G.A. section] 34-9-200(b) does
not require [the employee] to exhaust the dispute resolution process of
the WC/MCO before petitioning the Board for a change in physician.2 8
IV.

THE EXCLUSiVE REMEDY DOCTRINE

Having long been one of the fundamental principles of the Workers'
Compensation Act, the exclusive remedy doctrine was challenged again

during this survey period. In Freeman v. Barnes,29 the widow of a
Fulton County superior court judge who was killed by an escaped
prisoner filed an action for her husband's wrongful death against the
county sheriff and a number of his deputies due to their gross negligence. The sheriff moved to dismiss on a number of grounds, including
the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. The
trial court rejected the exclusive remedy claim.3 ° The court of appeals
affirmed in a split decision. 3 Two judges ruled that a superior court

24.

Id. at 877, 640 S.E.2d at 302.

25.

O.C.G.A. § 3-9-200(b) (2004).

26. Reid, 282 Ga. App. at 880, 640 S.E.2d at 304 (quoting Rules and Regulations of the
State Bd. of Workers' Compensation, Rule 208(f) (2007)).
27. Id. at 877, 640 S.E.2d at 302.
28. Id. at 881, 640 S.E.2d at 304-05 (footnotes omitted).
29. 282 Ga. App. 895, 640 S.E.2d 611 (2006).
30. Id. at 895, 640 S.E.2d at 612.
31. Id. at 902, 640 S.E.2d at 616.
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judge is an employee of the state and not a county.3 2 Consequently, the
judge and the sheriff were not employees of the same employer, and the
exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act would not
apply.33
In Stevenson v. Ray,34 a sheriff's deputy and his wife filed suit
against the deputy's co-worker asserting claims for personal injury and
loss of consortium after an automobile collision during a police chase.
They argued that the exclusive remedy provision did not apply because
while the co-worker was employed by the same employer, the co-worker
was off duty and had been advised by his supervisor against any active
involvement in the chase. The co-worker disregarded that directive and
was then involved in the motor vehicle accident with the plaintiff
deputy.3 5 The court of appeals held that because the plaintiff and the
defendant were both police officers, they were both on call, and therefore,
they were both in the course of their employment at the time of the
motor vehicle accident.36 Consequently, the injuries arose out of and
in the course of the co-workers' employment with the same employer.
It was thus proper for the superior court to grant the defendant's motion
for summary judgment based upon the exclusive remedy provision of the
Workers' Compensation Act. 8
In Burns International Security Services Corp. v. Johnson, 9 the
parents of a security guard brought a wrongful death action against the
deceased security guard's employer. The security guard had been
assigned to a job that posed a high security risk to the guard, and she
was not provided with a weapon or any other means of protection, nor
was she furnished with any form of mobile communication. The security
guard did not return from patrol one evening, and nearly three weeks
later, she was found dead on the assigned property.4" The trial court
denied the employer's motion for summary judgment, and the court of
appeals reversed, holding that "the trial court erred by failing to
conclude that [the security guard's] death arose out of and in the course
of her employment."41 The court determined that the uncontroverted
evidence-that the security guard's personal items were never retrieved,

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 899, 640 S.E.2d at 615.
See id.
282 Ga. App. 652, 640 S.E.2d 340 (2006).
Id. at 652-54, 640 S.E.2d at 341-42.
Id. at 644-45, 640 S.E.2d at 342.
Id.
Id.
284 Ga. App. 289, 643 S.E.2d 800 (2007).
Id. at 289-90, 643 S.E.2d at 801.
Id. at 293, 643 S.E.2d at 803.
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her body was discovered on the property, and she had been deceased for
two weeks, perhaps longer-demonstrated that the death occurred
within the period of her employment with the defendant.4 ' Thus, the
court held that the "remedy, if any, lies exclusively under the provisions
Act, and the trial court should have
of the Workers' Compensation
43
judgment."
summary
granted
V.

ANCILLARY JURISDICTION OVER COVERAGE DISPUTES

The Board has ancillary authority to resolve insurance policy coverage
issues when determining an employee's rights under the Workers'
In Royal Indemnity Co. v. Georgia Insurers
Compensation Act. 4
45
suffered a compensable claim that was
the
employee
Pool,
Insolvency
insurer, but a number of years
employer's
immediate
by
his
accepted
later, the insurer became insolvent, and the Georgia Insurers Insolvency
Pool (the "Insolvency Pool") began paying benefits to the employee. In
2005 the Insolvency Pool filed a declaratory judgment action in superior
court, contending that the employee was the statutory employee of
another employer and that the statutory employer and its insurer were
obligated to provide benefits and to repay $73,359.85 to the Insolvency
Pool. The alleged statutory employer and its insurance carrier filed a
motion for summary judgment, and the Insolvency Pool filed a crossmotion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the Insolvency
Pool's motion for summary judgment." However, the court of appeals
vacated the order and remanded the case with direction to dismiss
without prejudice, based upon the determination that the proper forum
to resolve ancillary coverage issues is the Board.47
VI.

NOTICE OF SUSPENSION OF BENEFITS

Before unilaterally suspending benefits based on an employee's change
48
in condition for the better, O.C.G.A. section 34-9-221(i) requires that
the employer give at least a ten-day notice of the intent to suspend
In Reliance Electric Co. v. Brightwell,5 ° the employee
benefits.4 9

42.
43.
44.
(2005).
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 292-93, 643 S.E.2d at 803.
Id. at 293, 643 S.E.2d at 803.
Builders Ins. Group v. Ker-Wil Enters., 274 Ga. App. 522, 524, 618 S.E.2d 160, 162
284 Ga. App. 787, 644 S.E.2d 279 (2007).
Id. at 789, 644 S.E.2d at 280.
Id. at 790, 644 S.E.2d at 281.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221(i) (2004 & Supp. 2007).
Id.
284 Ga. App. 235, 643 S.E.2d 742 (2007).
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suffered an injury that the employer accepted as compensable. Payment
of income benefits was initiated and continued until the employee was
released to return to work without restriction. The employer utilized a
Board form WC-2 to give notice of the suspension of temporary total
disability benefits, but the employee received only a six-day notice of the
employer's intent to suspend income benefits, rather than the ten days
required by O.C.G.A. section 34-9-221(i). The employee requested a
hearing, and the AIJ issued an award, finding that the employee had
indeed undergone a change in condition for the better and was able to
return to work without restrictions. However, because the employer had
failed to give a ten-day notice of the suspension, the ALJ ordered that
benefits be reinstated and continued through the date of the award. On
appeal, the appellate division of the Board affirmed the ALJ's order in
every respect, except it allowed suspension of disability benefits as of the
date of the ALJ hearing.5 "
The court of appeals reversed, holding that a technical violation of
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-221 does not bar an employer from contending that
less benefits are due after a certain date because of a change in
condition.12 Instead, a violation of O.C.G.A. section 34-9-221 subjects
the employer to potential liability for attorney fees and penalties if the
failure to properly suspend is without reasonable grounds.53 The court
of appeals rejected the argument that afi-mance of the lower court was
required by the case of Russell Morgan Landscape Management v. VelezOchoa.54 The court of appeals pointed out that the issue in that case
was whether the employer was entitled to suspend benefits as of the
date it filed the WC-2 or was required to pay benefits until the date of
the hearing.5 In determining that the Board had correctly set the date
of hearing as the suspension date, the court in Russell "relied on the fact
that the WC-2 [form] was wholly defective, listing the reason for
suspension of benefits as non-compliance with medical treatment," which
the ALJ later determined to be completely inaccurate.56 Consequently,
"[I]t was not until the date of the hearing that the employee could be
fairly said to be on notice of the reasons for the suspension of benefits." 7 That was not the case in Reliance.58

51. Id. at 235-37, 643 S.E.2d at 743.
52. Id. at 238, 643 S.E.2d at 745.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 239, 643 S.E.2d at 745; 252 Ga. App. 549, 556 S.E.2d 827 (2001).
55. Reliance, 284 Ga. App. at 239, 643 S.E.2d at 745 (citing Russell, 252 Ga. App. at
550-51, 556 S.E.2d at 829).
56. Id. (citing Russell, 252 Ga. App. at 550-51, 556 S.E.2d at 829).
57. Id. (citing Russell, 252 Ga. App. at 550-51, 556 S.E.2d at 829).
58. Id. at 239-40, 643 S.E.2d at 745.

470

MERCER LAW REVIEW

VII.

[Vol. 59

AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE

In Caremore, Inc. v. Hollis,5 9 the employee sustained a lower back
injury that was accepted as compensable. The employer began paying
income benefits, although it did not file any forms with the Board. The
parties stipulated that the employer had provided meals to the employee
at a subsidized rate, and the employee was required to pay only $1.00
for each meal, resulting in a net benefit of $3.00 per day and $15.00 per
week. The employer argued that this benefit should not have been
included in the calculation of the average weekly wage. 0 The court of
appeals held that the value of partially subsidized meals represented a
real economic gain to the employee and that value was properly included
in her average weekly wage.6
VIII.

RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR AND THE ACT

In Gassaway v. Precon Corp.," a case that was actually a tort case,
the court of appeals considered whether an employee was engaged in
furthering his employer's business when he was on an errand during his
lunch break and was involved in a car accident.6" In Gassaway an
engineer trainee with Precon Corp., Charles Duncan Smith, was
temporarily in Georgia for his job. He was paid on salary and did not
receive overtime compensation or punch a time clock. He was paid a per
diem of $270 per week for meals and lodging and reimbursed for mileage
if he used his personal vehicle for company business. On his first day
on the job site in Georgia, Smith asked the job superintendent if he
could take an extended lunch hour in order to find a place to live. The
superintendent granted his request.6 4
Smith drove his own vehicle during the lunch period. He ate lunch,
and then looked at and leased a mobile home and arranged for utility
service. He drove back to the job site, and as he was turning into the job
site, he had a collision with another vehicle. He was cited for failure to
yield the right of way. The plaintiffs in the other vehicle filed suit
against Smith's employer under the theory of respondeat superior.65

59. 283 Ga. App. 681, 642 S.E.2d 375 (2007).
60. Id. at 685, 642 S.E.2d at 379.
61. Id.
62. 280 Ga. App. 351, 634 S.E.2d 153 (2006).
63. Id. at 351-52, 634 S.E.2d at 155.
64. Id. at 352, 634 S.E.2d at 155.
65. Under this doctrine, an employer is responsible for its employee's torts only when
the torts are committed within the scope of employment and while the employee is engaged
in his employer's business. Torres v. Tandy Corp., 264 Ga. App. 686, 688, 592 S.E.2d 111,
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Precon Corp. filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that Smith
was not acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time the
collision occurred, and the trial court granted the motion.66 The court
of appeals agreed.67 The plaintiffs argued essentially that a determination that Smith was in the scope of employment for the purposes of
workers' compensation would then demand a determination that he was
in the scope of employment for purposes of their tort case. 68
One theory that the plaintiffs set forth was that Smith was on a
"special mission" for the employer, arguing that the temporary housing
was necessitated by Smith's job duties away from home.6 9 However,
the court cited the well-recognized principle that when "an employee
takes a break for lunch and is not otherwise engaged in his employer's
business, the employee is on a purely personal mission."" The court
determined that leasing the mobile home and arranging for utilities were
not part of the job duties and that Smith's job would not have been in
jeopardy if he had not done these errands. 71 He was given a per diem
for food and housing, but he could spend it any way he chose. Moreover,
the errands could have been accomplished at any time. Accordingly, the
court held that the primary beneficiary of these errands was Smith
himself, not his employer.72
The plaintiffs tried a second theory to bring the workers' compensation
angle back into their case. They argued that Smith's situation was like
that of a traveling salesman and that under the workers' compensation
statutes, had Smith been hurt, he would have been determined to be in
the course and scope of employment. Thus, the plaintiffs argued, for the
purposes of the tort suit, Smith should also be determined to be in the
course and scope of employment.7 3 The court pointed out that the few
negligence cases describing this type of scenario involved employees
driving their employers' cars, which was not the situation in this case.74
The court also pointed out the differences between the laws of workers'
compensation and the laws of negligence: "'To be injured within the
course or scope of one's employment in the context of the workers'

113 (2003).
66. Gassaway, 280 Ga. App. at 352, 634 S.E.2d at 155.
67. Id. at 355, 634 S.E.2d at 157.
68. Id. at 354-55, 634 S.E.2d at 157.
69. Id. at 353-54, 634 S.E.2d at 156.
70. Id.; accord Nelson v. Silver Dollar City, Inc., 249 Ga. App. 139, 145, 547 S.E.2d 630,
635 (2001).
71. Gassaway, 280 Ga. App. at 354, 634 S.E.2d at 157.
72. Id., 634 S.E.2d at 156-57.
73. Id. at 354-55, 634 S.E.2d at 157.
74. Id.; see, e.g., Gordy Constr. Co. v. Stewart, 216 Ga. App. 882,456 S.E.2d 245 (1995).
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compensation system is not the same thing as to be in the course or
scope of one's employment and cause injury to 75a third person who is
foreign to the employee-employer relationship.' ,
IX.

CHANGE IN CONDITION

In Korner v. Education Management Corp.,76 the employer and
insurer tried to show that the employee had undergone a change in
condition for the better, that the employee was capable of working, and
that there was suitable work available. This case highlights the heavy
burden an employer and insurer will have in attempting to suspend
benefits when an employee has a restricted work release and the original
employer cannot offer work.77
In Korner the employee had been employed as a clinical therapist for
Education Management Corp. ("EMC") for nearly four years when she
was attacked by a student that she was counseling. 7 Her physical
injuries cleared up fairly quickly, but she "received psychological and
psychiatric treatment for several years for Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder caused by the attack."79 It was undisputed that she could no
longer work with persons with psychological problems. However, she
had a B.A. and a Master's degree in social work, and in the past she had
worked in residential treatment centers, public schools, and private
practice, and she had enrolled in school to establish a new career.8 "
To try to prove that the employee had undergone a change in condition
for the better, which should allow a suspension of her weekly indemnity
benefits, the employer and insurer called a witness-a rehabilitation
counselor-to testify that there were suitable jobs in the marketplace
that this employee could perform. The rehabilitation counselor prepared
a market survey using ten pages from the employee's deposition and
notes from a conversation with EMC's counsel. She identified ten jobs
that she thought were appropriate, including sales representative for a
home furnishings store, foreign student advisor, library clerk, and blood
donor recruiter.8 "
Although the ALJ found that the employer and insurer met their
burden and allowed suspension of benefits, the appellate division

75. Gassaway, 280 Ga. App. at 354, 634 S.E.2d at 157 (quoting Jones v. Aldrich Co.,
188 Ga. App. 581, 583, 373 S.E.2d 649, 651 (1988)).
76. 281 Ga. App. 322, 635 S.E.2d 892 (2007).
77. Id. at 323, 635 S.E.2d at 893.
78. Id. at 322, 635 S.E.2d at 893.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 322-23, 635 S.E.2d at 893.
81. Id. at 324, 635 S.E.2d at 894.
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reversed the case. The appellate division held that the rehabilitation
counselor's testimony was insufficient because she did not know the
employee's rate of pay or whether the employee had past experience in
sales, marketing, general office work, or communications, and further,
many of the jobs did not even require an undergraduate degree, although
they did require certain background and experience requirements the
employee did not have. 2
The appellate division also determined that the employer and insurer's
rehabilitation counselor did not have enough information because she did
not talk to the claimant or the treating physicians. The employer and
insurer took issue with these determinations, noting that the Board
rules did not permit the counselor to speak to the treating physician and
that she could not have direct contact with the employee.8 3 The court
of appeals noted that the appellate division's determinations were
supported by the evidence, and thus neither it nor the superior court
could reverse the appellate division. 4
The court of appeals did
comment that other avenues had been available to the employer and
insurer, such as using a direct employee of the insurer to interview the
employee and her doctors, and that an independent medical exam was
also available to them. 8
In Fallin v. Merritt Maintenance & Welding, Inc.,86 the findings on
a change in condition case were more favorable to the employer and
insurer. Fallin sustained a work-related back injury in November 1998.
His indemnity benefits started late, and the employer and insurer never
paid the statutorily required penalty on the late benefits. In February
1999 the employer and insurer suspended Fallin's benefits and filed a
notice to controvert, asserting that he had undergone a change in
condition. The evidence showed that as of at least November 1999 the
employee had been working, holding various jobs. The ALJ and the
appellate division allowed
the suspension of benefits under the change
8 7
in condition theory.
The employee argued that because the employer and insurer never
paid him the few weeks of late penalties he was owed, they did not have
the right to controvert his case until those few weeks of late payments
were properly paid.88 He cited CartersvilleReady Mix Co. v. Hamby, 9

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id. at 324-25, 635 S.E.2d at 894.
Id. at 325, 635 S.E.2d at 894.
Id. at 324-25, 635 S.E.2d at 894.
283 Ga. App. 485, 642 S.E.2d 122 (2007).
Id. at 485, 642 S.E.2d at 122-23
Id. at 486, 642 S.E.2d at 123-24.
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which held that an employer and insurer could not controvert a case
under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-221(h) ° within sixty days of the claim
being accepted if all late penalties were not properly paid before the
controvert was filed. 91
However, the employer and insurer in Fallin did not controvert the
case under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-221(h), but did controvert under
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-221(i), 92 based only on a change in condition.

That statute states that when an employer and insurer want to
controvert a case based on a change in condition, they should file a
notice to controvert at least ten days prior to the suspension of
benefits .

The court of appeals easily distinguished this situation from Hamby,
as Hamby dealt with a situation where the employer and insurer tried
to go back and dispute the compensable nature of the employee's
injury.94 In Fallin the employer and insurer were not disputing the
compensable nature of the employee's condition but were arguing only
that he had a change in condition for the better, and they sought to
prove it by showing that he had actually been working.9 5 The court
seemed to have no sympathy for the employee, who admitted that he had
worked since 1999 but was essentially seeking seven years of benefits on
a technicality.96 The court also pointed out that if a notice to controvert is invalid, it does not preclude an employer and insurer from
asserting a change in condition.9 7

89. 224 Ga. App. 116, 479 S.E.2d 767 (1996).
90. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221(h) (2004 & Supp. 2007).
91. Hamby, 224 Ga. App. at 121, 479 S.E.2d at 771. As provided in O.C.G.A. section
34-9-221(h), "Where compensation is being paid without an award, the right to compensation shall not be controverted except upon the grounds of change in condition or newly
discovered evidence unless notice to controvert is filed with the board within 60 days of the
due date of first payment of compensation." O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221(h).
92. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221(i).
93. As provided in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-221(i),
Where compensation is being paid with or without an award and an employer
or insurer elects to controvert on the grounds of a change in condition or newly
discovered evidence, the employer shall, not later than ten days prior to the due
date of the first omitted payment of income benefits, file with the board and the
employee or beneficiary a notice to controvert the claim in the manner prescribed
by the board.
Id.
94. Fallin, 283 Ga. App. at 487, 642 S.E.2d at 124.
95. Id. at 486-87, 642 S.E.2d at 123-24.
96. Id.
97. Id.; see Sadie G. Mays Mem'l Nursing Home v. Freeman, 163 Ga. App. 557, 295
S.E.2d 340 (1982).
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In an odd set of facts, an employee and a second insurer got together
and argued that O.C.G.A. section 34-9-221(h) prevented the first insurer,
who was paying benefits, from challenging whether it actually owed the
employee's benefits. In TIG Specialty Insurance Co. v. Brown,98 the
employee was injured on December 28, 2000, a time period in which TIG
Specialty Insurance Co. ("TIG") insured his employer. The employee lost
no time from work, but he did get medical treatment, which TIG paid
for. On May 8, 2002, the employee was found unable to work, and TIG
began to pay indemnity benefits. As of February 1, 2002, the employer
had gotten coverage with another insurer, Zenith. In February 2004
TIG asked for a hearing to determine whether it was entitled to
reimbursement
from Zenith for the benefits it had paid to the employ99
ee.

The employee and Zenith filed separate motions to dismiss, citing
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-221(h) and arguing that TIG could not challenge
the employee's right to compensation because it had not filed its
challenge within sixty days of accepting the claim. 10 0 The ALJ denied
the motions, but the appellate division reversed and dismissed TIG's
request for a hearing. On appeal, TIG argued that it was not challenging the employee's right to benefits, but simply whether it should be the
one to pay them.'0 ' TIG cited to Columbus Intermediate Care Home,
Inc. v. Johnston, °2 which held that the sixty day statute of limitation
set out in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-221(h) did "'not reach a controversy
between two insurance companies wherein the compensability of the
claimant's injury goes unchallenged. "' 103
The Board, it appears, was wary of allowing TIG to go forward with
its hearing, concerned it might put the employee's right to compensation
in jeopardy considering he had not filed a claim against Zenith, and thus
Zenith might be able to challenge payment under the one-year statute
of limitations. 0 4 However, the court of appeals pointed out that as in
Johnston, there was no determination that the employee had a new
injury in May 2002 or that Zenith could successfully challenge payment
for such a claim.0 5 Essentially, the court of appeals stated that any
findings regarding whether the employee had a new injury and whether
98. 283 Ga. App. 445, 641 S.E.2d 684 (2007).
99. Id. at 445, 641 S.E.2d at 685.
100. Id. at 446, 641 S.E.2d at 686. See supra note 91 for full text of this Code section.
101. Id. at 447, 641 S.E.2d at 686.
102. 196 Ga. App. 516, 396 S.E.2d 268 (1990).
103. TIG Specialty Insurance, 283 Ga. App. at 447, 641 S.E.2d at 686 (quoting
Johnston, 196 Ga. App. at 517, 396 S.E.2d at 270).
104. See id.
105. Id.
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the second insurer might be responsible would be the province of an
06
Accordingly, the court reversed, allowing1 7TIG a chance to have
ALJ.'
the merits of its case considered before an ALJ.

X.

NOTICE OF AN ISSUE TO BE TRIED

When presented with the issue of whether an ALJ can, sua sponte,
award an employee permanent partial disability ("PPD") benefits when
that issue is not before that ALJ, the court of appeals reinforced the
principle that an insurer is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be
°9
heard on any issue.0 8 In Cypress Insurance Co. v. Duncan, the
main issue before the Board was whether an injured waitress was an
owner or an employee of a diner.110 But when the ALJ granted income
benefits for PPD and allowed offsetting of overpayment of indemnity
benefits, the insurer objected, having not been afforded notice of the
opportunity to be heard on the issue."' The court of appeals agreed
that the employer and insurer were entitled to notice and an opportunity
to be heard on the issue of PPD benefits and thus reversed the superior
court's affirmance of the award of PPD benefits. 2
XI.

NOTICES FROM THE BOARD

The decision in Winnersville Roofing Co. v. Coddington"'.shows how
much trouble an employer (or insurer) can get into if it ignores notices
from the Board. In that case, the employer was a sole proprietorship
operated by Wally Dennis. The employee filed a Board form WC-14, and
the Board sent at least three hearing notices to the employer. A "show
cause order" was sent as well, notifying the employer to produce
evidence of any workers' compensation insurance it may have had.
Dennis ignored the hearing notices and the show cause order. The
employer actually did have coverage, it seems, but Dennis never notified
his insurer. A hearing took place, and the ALJ ruled against the
did not appeal within the twenty-day time limit
employer. The employer
4
allowed by law.1

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
Cypress Ins. Co. v. Duncan, 281 Ga. App. 469, 472-73, 636 S.E.2d 159, 162 (2006).
281 Ga. App. 469, 636 S.E.2d 159 (2006).
Id. at 470, 636 S.E.2d at 160-61.
Id. at 472-73, 636 S.E.2d at 162.
Id.
283 Ga. App. 95, 640 S.E.2d 680 (2006).
Id. at 95, 640 S.E.2d at 681-82.
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When no payments were made by the employer, the employee took the
award to superior court and filed an action to have the court enforce the
award by entering judgment against the employer. The employer
retained counsel and filed a motion to vacate the award, stating that the
employer had not received the WC-14 and had not received notice of the
hearing. The employer also asked that the award be set aside and
showed that in fact it did have workers' compensation coverage.
Additionally, the employer asked the superior court to allow the insurer
to be added as a party.'15
The superior court denied the motion, noting that when a motion to
set aside a judgment is filed under O.C.G.A. section 9-11-60,116 the

115. Id. at 96, 640 S.E.2d at 682.
116. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60 (2006). In its entirety, O.C.G.A. section 9-11-60 provides as
follows:
(a) Collateralattack. Ajudgment void on its face may be attacked in any court
by any person. In all other instances, judgments shall be subject to attack only
by a direct proceeding brought for that purpose in one of the methods prescribed
in this Code section.
(b) Methods of direct attack. A judgment may be attacked by motion for a new
trial or motion to set aside. Judgments may be attacked by motion only in the
court of rendition.
(c) Motion for new trial. A motion for new trial must be predicated upon some
intrinsic defect which does not appear upon the face of the record or pleadings.
(d) Motion to set aside. A motion to set aside may be brought to set aside a
judgment based upon:
(1) Lack of jurisdiction over the person or the subject matter;
(2) Fraud, accident, or mistake or the acts of the adverse party unmixed with
the negligence or fault of the movant; or
(3) A nonamendable defect which appears upon the face of the record or
pleadings. Under this paragraph, it is not sufficient that the complaint or other
pleading fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, but the
pleadings must affirmatively show no claim in fact existed.
(e) Complaint in equity. The use of a complaint in equity to set aside a
judgment is prohibited.
(f) Procedure;time of relief. Reasonable notice shall be afforded the parties on
all motions. Motions to set aside judgments may be served by any means by
which an original complaint may be legally served if it cannot be legally served
as any other motion. A judgment void because of lack ofjurisdiction of the person
or subject matter may be attacked at any time. Motions for new trial must be
brought within the time prescribed by law. In all other instances, all motions to
set aside judgments shall be brought within three years from entry of the
judgment complained of.
(g) Clericalmistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of
the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected
by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and
after such notice, if any, as the court orders.
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party seeking relief must show that the grounds to set aside are
"'unmixed with [his own] negligence or fault."'117 In this case, because
the evidence showed that the employer received at least one of the three
notices of hearing sent out by the Board, but chose not to participate and
made no move to appeal after the award was issued, its motion to set
aside the award "necessarily had to fail as a result of its own admitted
neglect or fault."" 8
XII.

ANY EVIDENCE

In an "any evidence" case involving asbestosis, Putzel Electric
Contractors v. Jones,"9 the court of appeals held that the AUL's ruling
was supported by the evidence and thus affirmed the employee's right
to compensation. 2 ' In this case, the employee had breathing and lung
complications for years, but he contended that, although many different
explanations for his breathing problems had been offered, including
possible asbestos exposure, he had no definitive diagnosis of asbestosis
until some eleven years after his lung problems started. 2 ' The court
noted that in this occupational disease case, one that hinged on when
the employee first knew or should have known he had the disease, the
AIJ properly reviewed an extensive and detailed account of the
employee's medical history.'22 Because the medical records reviewed
by the ALJ contained some evidence in the record to support the
employee's claims, the superior court and the court of appeals affirmed
the Board's findings.123

(h) Law of the case rule. The law of the case rule is abolished; but generally
judgments and orders shall not be set aside or modified without just cause and,
in setting aside or otherwise modifying judgments and orders, the court shall
consider whether rights have vested thereunder and whether or not innocent
parties would be injured thereby; provided, however, that any ruling by the
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals in a case shall be binding in all
subsequent proceedings in that case in the lower court and in the Supreme Court
or the Court of Appeals as the case may be.
Id.
117. Coddington, 283 Ga. App. at 96, 640 S.E.2d at 682 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-1160(d)(2)).
118. Id. at 97, 640 S.E.2d at 683.
119. 282 Ga. App. 539, 639 S.E.2d 540 (2006).
120. Id. at 546, 639 S.E.2d at 545.
121. Id. at 541-42, 639 S.E.2d at 542-43.
122. Id. at 544-45, 639 S.E.2d at 544.
123. Id. at 545, 639 S.E.2d at 545.
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XIII. DUTY OF AN EMPLOYER UNDER AN INSURANCE CONTRACT
In a case that emphasized the duty of a business owner to ensure that
he understands the contents of a contract before signing it, the court of
appeals held that an insurer had a right to charge a paint contractor a
higher premium according to its contract, even though the paint
contractor claimed that he could not read well enough to understand the
contract.12 4 In Brewer v. Royal Insurance Co. of America,125 the
paint contractor obtained a workers' compensation policy from Royal
Insurance Co. of America ("Royal"), and as part of his application, he
stated that he did not use subcontractors, which resulted in his premium
being very low. He was audited by the insurer, as the contract allowed,
and when the insurer found that he was using
126 subcontractors, the
insurer sent him a bill for additional premiums.
The paint contractor refused to pay, and the insurer filed suit for the
additional monies. When the insurer filed for summary judgment, it was
granted. The paint contractor stated that he could not read very well
but admitted that he spoke to the agent, signed the application for the
insurance, paid the low premium, and then received a copy of the policy,
which allowed the insurer to audit him. He admitted he could have had
127
his wife or the agent read the policy to him, but he did not do so.

The court said that in the absence of fraud preventing the owner from
reading his contact, the terms of the contract would stand, and his own
failure to read it or obtain an explanation of the contract amounted to
negligence that would prevent him from avoiding the contract on the
ground that he was ignorant of its contents.128
XIV.

CREDITS

The decision in Vought Aircraft Industries v. Faulds29 demonstrates
the perils of failing to follow the procedures set forth by Board Rule
243'30 for taking credit for disability benefits paid in lieu of indemnity
benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act. 131

124.
(2007).
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Brewer v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 283 Ga. App. 312, 314, 641 S.E.2d 291, 293
283 Ga. App. 312, 641 S.E.2d 291 (2007).
Id. at 312-13, 641 S.E.2d at 291-92.
Id. at 314, 641 S.E.2d at 293.
Id. at 313-15, 641 S.E.2d at 292-93.
281 Ga. App. 338, 636 S.E.2d 75 (2006).
Rules and Regulations of the State Bd. of Workers' Compensation, Rule 243 (2007).
Faulds, 281 Ga. App. at 338-39, 636 S.E.2d at 76-77.
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A hearing was initially held in April 2002 at which the ALJ determined that the employee, Faulds, sustained a compensable injury to his
right elbow and was entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Prior
to the initial hearing, the employer had paid Faulds for twenty weeks of
non-workers' compensation disability benefits during the time for which
13 2
he was subsequently awarded workers' compensation benefits.
Board Rule 243 requires that when an employer seeks a credit for wages
or benefits previously paid to an injured worker, notice must be provided
to the opposing party on Board form WC-243 "'no later than ten days
prior to a hearing."" 3 The employer, however, attempted to file Board
form WC-243 on the date of the original hearing in April 2002, and the
request for a credit
ALJ ruled that she would not hear the employer's
34
because the request was not timely filed.1
In March 2003 Faulds's injury was designated as catastrophic by the
Board. In 2005 another hearing was held in the case, based upon the
employer's contention that the employee had undergone a change in
condition for the better and to redesignate the employee's injury as noncatastrophic. 135 At the 2005 hearing, the employer also attempted to
revisit the question of whether it was entitled a credit under O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-243131 for the twenty weeks of non-workers' compensation
disability benefits paid to the employee.' 37
The court of appeals affirmed the decisions of both the Board and the
superior court in their findings that the doctrine of res judicata barred
any further determination regarding the employer's entitlement to a
credit under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-243.18 Although the merits of the
employer's claim for a credit were never determined at the first hearing,
the employer's failure to timely raise the issue in accordance with Board
Rule 243 amounted to a waiver because the doctrine of res judicata
applies to all issues that are "'put in issue or which under the rules of
law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was
rendered.' 139 By failing to timely file Board form WC-243 more than

132. Id. at 339, 636 S.E.2d at 76.
133. Id. at 338, 636 S.E.2d at 76 (quoting Rules and Regulations of the State Bd. of
Workers' Compensation, Rule 243).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-243 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
137. Faulds, 281 Ga. App. at 338, 636 S.E.2d at 76.
138. Id.
139. Webb v. City of Atlanta, 228 Ga. App. 278, 279, 491 S.E.2d 492, 493 (1997)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 (2006)).
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ten days before the first hearing, the employer was barred in any
subsequent hearing from raising the credit issue.14 °
XV. SUICIDE

As long provided under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-17(a),4
workers'
compensation benefits are not allowed for "intentionally self-inflicted
injury.'14' The case of Bayer Corp. v.Lassiter14 provides an example
of when suicide, by definition a self-inflicted injury, can still be
compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act.'"
Lassiter sustained compensable back and leg injuries in a work-related
motor vehicle accident, and he also developed severe tinnitus, which was
subsequently determined to be related to the accident. When Lassiter
subsequently committed suicide by shooting himself with a rifle, his
widow sought workers' compensation death benefits, alleging that her
husband's suicide was causally related to unbearable pain associated
with his compensable tinnitus. 45
In support of this claim, Mrs.
Lassiter presented evidence that her husband had no prior significant
medical problems, that he had never complained previously of ringing in
his ears, that the onset of the tinnitus following the accident caused a
personality change in her husband that adversely impacted his judgment
and caused him to be afraid to make decisions, and that he would go to
the extreme of using a mechanical leaf blower "because that noise was
the only thing that could drown out the ringing in his ears."146 In
addition, Mrs. Lassiter testified that the day before he killed himself, he
told her that "he had 'to do something' about the ringing in his
ears." "47
'
In support of her claim, Mrs. Lassiter also presented the
testimony of a psychiatrist, Dr. Michael Hilton, who testified that
Lassiter's suicide was directly related to the tinnitus and a "'disturbance
of the mind"' caused by that disease. 4 ' Dr. Hilton also specifically
testified that Lassiter's disturbance in his mind so impacted his
judgment that he deemed suicide preferable to living with the pain
caused by the tinnitus. 4 9

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Faulds, 281 Ga. App. at 338, 636 S.E.2d at 76.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-17(a) (2004).
Id.
282 Ga. App. 346, 638 S.E.2d 813-14 (2006).
See id. at 348-50, 638 S.E.2d at 813-14.
Id. at 346, 638 S.E.2d at 812.
Id. at 348, 638 S.E.2d at 813.
Id. at 347, 638 S.E.2d at 813.
Id. at 348, 638 S.E.2d at 813.
Id.
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The employer and insurer did, not present evidence to refute either the
testimony of the widow or Dr. Hilton but instead based their defense
5°
upon the court of appeals decision in Dry Storage Corp. v. Piscopo,"
"which held that a suicide allegedly resulting from a tortfeasor's
negligence is not ... a reasonably foreseeable consequence of that
negligence."151 The employer argued that Lassiter's suicide could not
be viewed as causally related to his compensable workers' compensation
injuries.""'
The court of appeals rejected this defense for two rea53
sons. 1
The court first pointed to the fallacy in attempting to impose
standards of tort law on a workers' compensation claim.'5 4 Looking
back to the Act's fundamental premise, the court pointed out that
workers' compensation arose as a statutory exemption to tort law,
providing no-fault recovery for accidents that arise out of and in the
course of employment, while providing employers with immunity from
tort claims brought by injured workers.155 As the court put it,
In light of the purpose and design of the [Workers' Compensation Act],
the question of whether Mr. Lassiter's suicide was a reasonably
foreseeable result of his automobile accident is irrelevant to the current
action. That issue would be relevant only in a wrongful death action
'
brought against an alleged tortfeasor. 56
Second, the court held that prior precedent requires a different
analysis in a workers' compensation claim involving suicide than the
proximate cause analysis used in a wrongful death claim.157 It has
long been held that for suicide to be compensable under the Workers'
Compensation Act, the evidence must show that the suicide was "caused
by severe pain and despair proximately resulting from the accident
sufficient to cause a disturbance of the mind and the overriding of
normal judgment to the extent that the act, although 'purposeful' is
found to be not 'intentional.'""'
In essence, this analysis requires a
two-step process: to determine (1) if the injury complained of was
compensable and (2) if the pain associated with the injury causes the

150.
151.
at 900,
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

249 Ga. App. 898, 560 S.E.2d 419 (2001).
Bayer, 282 Ga. App. at 348, 638 S.E.2d at 814 (citing Dry Storage, 249 Ga. App.
560 S.E.2d at 420-21).
Id. at 349, 638 S.E.2d at 814.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 349-50, 638 S.E.2d at 814.
McDonald v. At. Steel Co., 133 Ga. App. 157, 158, 210 S.E.2d 344, 345 (1974).
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employee "to be so devoid of his normal judgment that his conduct in
taking his life could not be viewed as intentional under [O.C.G.A.
section] 34-9-17(a)."' 59 As noted above, the employer presented no
evidence to rebut the testimony of the widow and Dr. Hilton that the
pain from Lassiter's tinnitus was both overwhelming and overcame his
judgment to the point that his suicide was not intentional. Because the
evidence supported the Board's decision that Lassiter's death was related
to his compensable injuries,160 the court affirmed the award of death
benefits to Lassiter's widow.
XVI.

CATASTROPHIC DESIGNATION

The Georgia Court of Appeals issued three decisions during the survey
period further interpreting the definition of a "catastrophic injury" under
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-200.1.16' These three cases dealt specifically
with the catch-all portion of the statute that defines a catastrophic
injury as "[a]ny other injury of a nature and severity that prevents the
employee from being able to perform his or her prior work and any work
the national economy for which
available in substantial numbers within
16 2
such employee is otherwise qualified."
The decision in Caswell, Inc. v. Spencer 61 serves as caution against
either party making assumptions regarding an employee's ability to
work without first laying an evidentiary foundation for those assumptions. Spencer sustained compensable back injuries in the course of his
employment with Caswell, Inc., and a hearing was held to determine
Prior to the evidenwhether his injuries qualified as catastrophic."
tiary hearing, an administrative decision issued by the Rehabilitation
Section of the Board recommended that Spencer's injury be considered
catastrophic, based in part upon the fact that "a 62-year-old is inherently
unable to adapt to the demands of work within the light duty
range."165

The court of appeals agreed with the Board's rejection of this
assumption, holding that evidence from a vocational expert supported
the Board's conclusion that there are jobs available in the national
economy for which the employee was qualified and capable of perform-

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Bayer, 282 Ga. App. at 350, 638 S.E.2d at 814.
Id. at 349-50, 638 S.E.2d at 814.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200.1 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
Id. § 34-9-200.1(g)(6)(A).
280 Ga. App. 141, 633 S.E.2d 449 (2006).
Id. at 141, 633 S.E.2d at 450.
Id. at 142, 633 S.E.2d at 451.
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ing. 66 The court further ruled that the ALJ conducting the evidentiary hearing was entitled to reject a rehabilitation counselor's testimony
that Spencer was unable to learn new skills because of his age for two
reasons: (1) the testimony was unsupported by any medical or psychological evidence and (2) the counselor did not perform any tests on the
employee to determine his ability to learn but instead relied solely upon
Social Security standards that were not placed into evidence.' 67 The
court rejected Spencer's argument on appeal that the Board did not
include consideration of his age in denying catastrophic injury status,
holding that the Board specifically relied upon the testimony of a
vocational specialist who testified that he was unaware of any school of
thought in vocational rehabilitation that a sixty-two-year-old cannot
learn new skills.'68
Further, the court noted that this specialist
testified that research in fact demonstrates that many people of
retirement age are returning to work, that people of any age can learn
a new skill, and that there were some four million jobs available in the
national economy that were suitable for Spencer.'6 9
In a different context, the court of appeals similarly rejected an
employee's claim for catastrophic status when the only evidence she
presented to demonstrate that she was "unable to perform any work
available in substantial numbers within the economy" was her own
testimony that she had looked for work. 7 ° In Reid v. Georgia Building
Authority,'' the employee sustained compensable injuries to two
fingers on her dominant right hand, and her subsequent restrictions,
which included no heavy gripping or lifting more than ten pounds,
rendered her unable to perform the housekeeping work she had
previously performed for the Georgia Building Authority. 7 2
In
attempting to have her injury designated as catastrophic, however, she
merely testified that she had "'looked for work,'" and presented the
testimony of a physical therapist who testified regarding her sedentary
work restrictions and her difficulty gripping during a functional capacity
evaluation. 7 ' No testimony or evidence was presented regarding the
availability of work in the national economy for which Reid was

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Reid v. Ga. Bldg. Auth., 283 Ga. App. 413, 416, 641 S.E.2d 642, 646 (2007).
283 Ga. App. 413, 641 S.E.2d 642 (2007).
Id. at 414, 641 S.E.2d at 644-45.
Id. at 416, 641 S.E.2d at 646.
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otherwise qualified. The Board, nevertheless, awarded the employee
catastrophic injury designation, concluding that
"it is very unlikely that [Reid] is or ever will be able to return to her
prior work in housekeeping for the Employer or for any other employer.
Moreover, as a result of her injuries ...[Reid] is a sixty-six year old
one-armed housekeeper whose remaining useful arm is her nondominant arm, who is without any other skills, training, or experience,
and . . . it is more likely than not that such restrictions make [her]
unable to perform any economically meaningful work."" 4
The court of appeals rejected the Board's designation of a catastrophic
injury, concluding that the Board lacked a sufficient evidentiary
foundation to support its conclusions:
[Tihe Board determined that the injury was catastrophic based solely
on its own experience. Thus, the issue is whether the Board may reach
such a conclusion in the absence of competent evidence that the
employee is unable to perform any work available in substantial
numbers within the economy. We hold that it cannot. 175
The court went on to hold that at a minimum, an employee must present
evidence in the form of a vocational expert or other testimony to
demonstrate that 176
the substantial numbers of jobs she could perform
were unavailable.

The case of Rite-Aid Corp. v. Davis177 will have limited application

because it involves the interpretation of an older version of O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-200.1,178 but it is nevertheless interesting for its analysis
of the wording of this statute and for the sharp division it created on the
Georgia Court of Appeals. Davis sustained compensable injuries to her
neck and shoulder and argued that the injuries should be designated as
catastrophic-even though she could perform work available in
substantial numbers in the national economy-because she was unable
to perform her prior job for the Rite-Aid Corporation. 79 Although the
ALJ accepted the employee's argument, the appellate division of the
Board reversed, finding that the language in the 1996 version of
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-200.1 required the employee to show both that she

174. Id. at 415, 641 S.E.2d at 645 (first alteration in original) (first and second brackets
in original).
175. Id. at 416, 641 S.E.2d at 646.
176. Id.; see also Davis v. Carter Mech., Inc., 272 Ga. App. 773, 612 S.E.2d 879 (2005).
177.

280 Ga. App. 522, 634 S.E.2d 480 (2006).

178. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200.1 (1992 & Supp. 1996) (current version at O.C.G.A. § 34-9200.1 (2004 & Supp. 2007)).
179. Rite Aid, 280 Ga. App. at 523, 634 S.E.2d at 481.
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could not perform her prior job and that she could not perform other
work available in substantial numbers in the national economy for which
she was qualified. 180 The court of appeals, however, affirmed the
superior court's reversal of the appellate division's decision, holding that
the old version of the catastrophic injury definition unambiguously
allowed the employee to prove that her injury was catastrophic merely
by showing that she could not perform her prior work.'8 1
Prior to an amendment in 1997,182 the catch-all provision of O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-200.1(g)(6) stated that a catastrophic injury definition
included "'[a]ny other injury of a nature and severity that prevents the
employee from being able to perform his or her prior work or any work
' 183
available in substantial numbers within the national economy.
The issue before the court of appeals was, very simply, whether to
interpret the word "or" between "prior work" and "any work available in
substantial numbers within the national economy" as disjunctive or
conjunctive.' 84 The appellate division of the Board concluded that the
legislature meant for the term to be used in the conjunctive, in part,
because "'the intent was not to define a catastrophic injury less strictly
than the generally accepted definition of ordinary total disability."" 5
The appellate division further concluded that the legislature's 1997
amendment to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-200.1, which clarified that an
employee must prove both an inability to perform prior work and the
inability to perform any work available in substantial numbers in the
national economy, was further evidence of the legislature's original
intent.'8 6 On appeal, the employer argued in favor of both of the
appellate division's conclusions.' 87
The court of appeals, however, rejected both of these arguments,
determining simply that the legislature's original language was not
ambiguous and therefore could not be construed as the employer
alleged.'88 Writing for a three judge dissent, Judge Bernes criticized,
as did the appellate division, a construction that defines a catastrophic
injury less severely than ordinary disability, which requires proof that
the employee is unable to find any work for which he or she is suited by

180. Id. at 525, 634 S.E.2d at 483.
181. Id. at 523, 525, 634 S.E.2d at 481, 483.
182. 1997 Ga. Laws 1367, 1367-75.
183. Rite-Aid, 280 Ga. App. at 523, 634 S.E.2d at 481 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-9200.1(g)(6) (Supp. 1997) (current version at O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200.1 (2004 & Supp. 2007)).
184. Id. at 525, 634 S.E.2d at 482.
185. Id. at 526, 634 S.E.2d at 483.
186. Id. at 525-26, 634 S.E.2d at 483.
187. Id. at 526, 634 S.E.2d at 483.
188. Id., 634 S.E.2d at 484.
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training and experience.' 89 As Judge Bernes stated, "[Applying the
literal meaning would lead to the absurd result of allowing an employee
to obtain catastrophic injury benefits by meeting a standard equal to or
90
less strict than the standard for proving temporary total disability.'
XVII.

APPEALS

The decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Parker'9' answers the
question of how a party should proceed in a workers' compensation
appeal to a superior court when the court fails to provide notice of its
judgment as required by O.C.G.A. section 15-6-21(c). 192 Wal-Mart
appealed a decision of the Board to the superior court, which failed to
timely provide notice of its decision as required by O.C.G.A. section 15-621(c). 1 93 While the superior court acknowledged that Wal-Mart had
not received notice of its decision as required, it denied Wal-Mart's
motion to vacate and reenter a judgment so that it could timely pursue
an appeal to the Georgia Court of Appeals.' 94 The superior court
reasoned that Wal-Mart ignored the provisions of O.C.G.A. section 34-9105(b),' 9 which stated in part that the superior court must issue a
decision within twenty days of the date it hears the workers' compensation appeal, or the decision of the Board is deemed affirmed by operation
of law.' 96 The superior court found that Wal-Mart was not diligent in
determining whether a decision had been reached within the twenty-day
deadline provided by O.C.G.A. section 34-9-105(b) and therefore denied
Wal-Mart's request to vacate its earlier order.' 97
The court of appeals reversed, holding that it was the superior court,
not the appealing party, which has the obligation to notify parties of its
decision. 98 In addition to holding that the superior court's decision
was contrary to the duty imposed by O.C.G.A. section 15-6-21(c), the
court of appeals held that

189. Id. at 529, 634 S.E.2d at 485 (Bernes, J., dissenting).
190. Id., 634 S.E.2d at 486.
191. 283 Ga. App. 708, 642 S.E.2d 387 (2007).
192. O.C.G.A. § 15-6-21(c) (2004).
193. Id. The statute provides that "it shall be the duty of the [superior court] judge to
file his or her decision with the clerk of the court in which the cases are pending and to
notify the attorney or attorneys of the losing party of his or her decision." Id.
194. Parker,283 Ga. App. at 709, 642 S.E.2d at 388.
195. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(b) (2004 & Supp. 2007).
196. Parker, 283 Ga. App. at 709, 642 S.E.2d at 388.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 709-10, 642 S.E.2d at 388-89.
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[iut was also improper for the superior court to decide Wal-Mart's
motion based upon a determination that Wal-Mart knew or should
have known that a judgment had been entered. Appellate courts of
this state have repeatedly held that the issue is not whether the losing
party had knowledge that judgment was entered, but whether the court
had carried out the duty imposed upon it by [O.C.G.A. section] 15-621(c). 199
The court of appeals therefore reversed the decision of the superior court
and directed it to vacate its earlier judgment so that Wal-Mart could
proceed with an appeal on the merits. °0
XVIII.

CONTINUOUS EMPLOYMENT

A sharply divided Georgia Supreme Court once again explored the
murky waters of the continuous employment doctrine in the case of Ray
Bell Construction Co. v. King.2"' While the court did not enunciate any
new legal principles in this area, the case serves as yet another
illustration of the difficulties in identifying the parameters of employment for those whose work carries them beyond a regular work schedule.
Howard King, a resident of Florida, was employed by Ray Bell
Construction Co. ("Ray Bell") as a construction superintendent on a job
site in Butts County, Georgia. Ray Bell provided King with company
housing in Fayetteville, Georgia, as well as the use of a company-owned
truck for both work and personal use. King had been out of work for a
week on sick leave while recovering from non-work-related knee surgery
when, on a Sunday, he drove the company owned truck from Fayetteville
to Alamo, Georgia, to deliver family furniture to a storage shed on
property he owned. On his return trip, he suffered fatal injuries in a
motor vehicle accident in Monroe County, Georgia, which is adjacent to
Butts County. At the time of the accident, King was carrying Ray Bell
tools in his truck and was returning either to his company-provided
20 2
housing in Fayetteville or to his job site in Butts County.
After the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed a decision by the Board
awarding death benefits to King's widow, 2 3 the Georgia Supreme
Court accepted the case on appeal because it was concerned whether the

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
Daniel
475-76

Id. at 710, 642 S.E.2d at 389.
Id. at 711, 642 S.E.2d at 390.
281 Ga. 853, 642 S.E.2d 841 (2007).
Ray Bell Constr. Co. v. King, 277 Ga. App. 144, 145, 625 S.E.2d 541, 542 (2006).
Id. at 148, 625 S.E.2d at 544. For a discussion of this case, see H. Michael Bagley,
C. Kniffen & Katherine D. Dixon, Workers' Compensation, 58 MERCER L. REV. 453,
(2006).
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court of appeals had applied the correct two-pronged test for a compensable injury reiterated in Mayor of Savannah v. Stevens. 2°4 Stevens dealt
with an off-duty police officer injured in her personal vehicle while
driving to work.2 °5 While noting that Stevens's obligations as a police
officer required her to enforce the law at any time while she was in the
Savannah city limits and that she was therefore in the course of her
employment at the time of her automobile accident, the court nevertheless denied workers' compensation benefits, holding that the accident
also had to arise out of her duties as a police officer. 2 6 The court
stated,
Stevens' car accident in this case was in no way related to her work
as a police officer. At the time of the accident, she was not actively
engaged in any police work nor was she responding to a law enforcement problem. The hazards she encountered were in no way occasioned by her job as a police officer. Because there was no causal
connection between her employment and her accident, Stevens' injuries
did not arise out of her employment."'
Therefore, the court in Stevens emphasized that while the continuous
employment doctrine expands the parameters of when an employee is in
the course of employment, to be compensable, an injury must nevertheless still be related to the hazards connected with the employment in
order to establish a causal connection required for the injury to arise out
of employment.20 8
Presumably, therefore, the court's analysis in Ray Bell would center
on whether King's fatal auto accident was connected to a hazard of his
employment. Instead, the court shifted focus away from its analysis in
Stevens and focused on whether King's deviation from his employment
to take furniture to a storage shed had sufficiently ended so that he was
brought back within the proximity of the area in which he was in
continuous employment.20 9 Interestingly, the court began its analysis
by reference to the adage that the Workers' Compensation Act is "'a
humanitarian measure which should be liberally construed to effectuate
its purpose."'2 10 In referring to how it would construe the Workers'
Compensation Act, the court made no reference to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-

204. Ray Bell, 281 Ga. at 854, 642 S.E.2d at 843; 278 Ga. 166, 598 S.E.2d 456 (2004).
205. Stevens, 278 Ga. at 166, 598 S.E.2d at 457.
206. Id. at 167, 598 S.E.2d at 458.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Ray Bell, 281 Ga. at 856, 642 S.E.2d at 844.
210. Id. at 854, 642 S.E.2d at 843 (quoting City of Waycross v. Holmes, 272 Ga. 488,
489, 532 S.E.2d 90, 91 (2000)).
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passed in 1994, which provides, "This chapter shall be liberally
construed only for the purpose of bringing employers and employees
within the provisions of this chapter and to provide protection for both
*. . [and t]he provisions of this chapter shall be construed and applied
impartially to both employers and employees."212 Presumably, this
statute superseded previous case law interpretations regarding the
liberal construction of the Workers' Compensation Act, imposing a
requirement that such a construction only be used for the purpose of
defining whether a particular employer or employee sufficiently meets
the statutory definition to fall within workers' compensation coverage.
The question of whether King's accident arose out of and in the course
of his employment does not involve whether he is subject to the Workers'
Compensation Act, as he was clearly an employee of Ray Bell; rather,
the issue before the court was simply whether his death arose out of and
in the course of his employment-seemingly an issue that would require
an impartial, as opposed to liberal, construction under O.C.G.A. section
23,211

34-9-23.213

Nevertheless, the court went on to discuss the well-settled principle
that traveling employees are deemed to be in continuous employment
while away from home in the performance of their duties.214 Therefore, traveling employees are afforded a much broader scope of workers'
compensation coverage, which includes "activities performed in a
reasonable and prudent manner for the health and comfort of the
employee, including recreational activities."215

The court then turned

to the analysis of whether King's deviation to an admittedly non-workrelated activity (taking family furniture to an out-of-town location) had
sufficiently ended to bring him back within the scope of his employment
for Ray Bell.21 Determining that the fatal car accident occurred in a
county contiguous to where King was performing his job for Ray Bell,
the court held that this evidence was sufficient for the Board to conclude
that his death fell within the scope of his employment, stating, "With
King's return to the general proximity of the Fayetteville-Jackson area
in which he was in continuous employment as a traveling employee, his
continuous employment coverage resumed whether he was resuming his

211. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-23 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
212. Id.
213. See Ray Bell, 281 Ga. at 854, 642 S.E.2d at 843.
214. Id. at 856, 642 S.E.2d at 844.
215. Id. at 855,642 S.E.2d at 844; see also Thornton v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
198 Ga. 786, 790, 32 S.E.2d 816, 819 (1945); McDonald v. State Highway Dep't, 127 Ga.
App. 171, 176, 192 S.E.2d 919, 923-24 (1972).
216. Ray Bell, 281 Ga. at 856, 642 S.E.2d at 845.
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trip to the employer's job site ... or was returning to his employerprovided housing."2 17
In contrast to its analysis in Stevens, the court in Ray Bell focused less
on whether the employee was engaged in an activity connected to the
hazard of his employment and instead focused more on simply whether
the accident occurred in proximity to the area where he was working for
his employer. In so doing, the court recognized the significance of the
situation where an employee's job requires him or her to work away from
home, live in employer-provided housing, and use employer-provided
transportation. In essence, an employer will have an uphill battle in
denying such a case because virtually everything an employee does is
connected in some way to a "hazard" of his or her employment and
because the employee would not be away from home and exposed to
those particular hazards but for the traveling nature of his or her
employment. As the court pointed out in Ray Bell, the exception to such
coverage is deviation for activities of a purely personal and non-workrelated nature.2 1
In King's case, his personal mission to deliver
furniture was deemed to have sufficiently ended when he reentered the
general proximity of his employment with Ray Bell, and therefore, his
death was deemed to be a compensable event.2 19
In a footnote, the supreme court indicated at least two circumstances
that might have changed the result: (1) if King's employment had been
terminated or (2) if his employer had suspended the requirement that
King live away from home during his medical leave.22 ° Presumably,
had Ray Bell advised King that while on medical leave he was not
required to be away from home, then his status of continuous employment would not have applied. 21
It is also interesting to note that the court might have evaluated this
case under the long-established presumption in workers' compensation
death cases that a death is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act if the employee is found dead or dying in a place he might
reasonably be expected to be in the performance of his duties.222 While
the analysis under this theory would still have focused on the nature of
King's continuous employment, the law would have established a

217. Id. at 856-57, 642 S.E.2d at 845 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
218. Id. at 856, 642 S.E.2d at 844.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 857 n.2, 642 S.E.2d at 845 n.2.
221. See id.
222. Goode Bros. Poultry Co. v. Kin, 201 Ga. App. 557, 558, 411 S.E.2d 724, 725 (1991);
S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hodges, 164 Ga. App. 757, 760, 298 S.E.2d 570, 574 (1982);
Zamora v. Coffee Gen. Hosp., 162 Ga. App. 82, 84, 290 S.E.2d 192, 193 (1982).
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presumption of compensability if he were merely in a place he might be
expected to be in performance of his duties.223 While the court did not
comment on this particular theory, it did note that King's accident might
have been compensable under a different workers' compensation theory
involving accidents that occur when an employee is using an employerprovided vehicle, stating,
We note that an award of compensation based on the finding of the
appellate division of the State Board of Workers' Compensation that
King had been injured on his way to the job site is also supported by
application of the doctrine which provides coverage to an employee
injured on his way to or from work while in a24vehicle furnished by the
employer as an incident of the employment.
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Melton, writing for two other
justices, stated that King's death was not compensable because the
purely personal mission from which he was returning did not create any
opportunity for him to resume his employment activities, pointing out,
These "limited deviation" cases are inapplicable to the matter at hand
. ..because King's mission was wholly personal from its inception....
He could not have resumed his employer's business on his mission
because there was no business to resume. On a given mission, one
cannot go back into or resume something one has never started. 225
The dissent also pointed out that even if the cases cited by the majority
were applicable, King "was still in the process of completing his wholly
personal mission" at the time of his death, and therefore he had not
resumed his continuous employment.226
Perhaps the case of Ray Bell is best understood as reinforcing the
principle that traveling employees have an even broader scope of
employment than others, such as police officers and firemen, whose
continuous employment is established not by having to be away from
home, but rather by simply being on call. For traveling employees, the
mere fact of having to be away from home brings the hazards they
encounter within the scope of their employment, whereas those
employees who are merely on call (such as the police officer in Stevens)
are not brought within employment-related hazards until they engage
in some work-related activity.

223.
224.
225.
226.

Ray Bell, 281 Ga. at 858, 642 S.E.2d at 846.
Id. at 857 n.3, 642 S.E.2d at 845 n.3.
Id. at 859-60, 642 S.E.2d at 847 (Melton, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 861, 642 S.E.2d at 848.

